In this paper we study the behavior of boundedly rational agents in a two good economy where trading is costly with respect to time. All individuals have a xed time budget and may spend time for the production of good one, the production of good two and trading. They update their strategies, which determine their time allocation, according to a simple imitation type learning rule with noise. In a setup with two di erent type of agents with di erent production technologies we show by the means of simulations that both direct trade and trade via mediators who specialize in trading can emerge. We can also observe the transition from a pure production economy via direct trade to an economy with mediated trade. JEL Classi cation: D83, F10
Introduction
Mediated trade is a phenomenon which can be observed in many di erent markets in the real world economy. Examples reach from retail stores to real estate agents and stock brokers. In all those cases 'producers' do not directly deal with the 'consumers' of their goods but there are middlemen in-between who facilitate the trades. The basic role of these middlemen is to reduce the search costs of buyers and sellers needed to nd an appropriate trading partner. The middlemen pro t from these transactions by marking up their selling prices but it is quite obvious that in many instances trading via mediators nevertheless pays o for all agents in the economy. This observation indicates that many goods are not traded on central markets but more complicated structures have developed in order to reduce the transaction costs. However, the question how these structures evolve has not attracted too much attention of economics scholars up to now.
In most economic models the problem of search and transaction costs in trading is neglected and it is assumed that producers and consumers have no problems nding each other and agreeing on the equilibrium price to carry out the trade 1 There are several exceptions like Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) , Day (1994) or Pingle (1997) where middlemen are explicitly introduced into a model of trade. Rubinstein and Wolinsky demonstrate how this topic can be dealt with in an equilibrium framework but if we relax the demanding assumption underlying this concept we have to study a decentralized economy consisting of several self interested but boundedly rational individuals. These individuals are not a priori organized and also do not have rational expectations about the actions of other market members. The general question arising in this context is whether a perfectly organized market does indeed emerge in such a model and how the market structure looks like.
In order to study the emergence of market organization an agent based approach using a population of heterogeneous interacting individuals is very well suited. The agents are boundedly rational and determine their actions based on imitation of successful other individuals and own experience. Experiments have shown that such kind of behavior can indeed be observed when people are dealing with an unknown environment Pingle (1995) ]. The setting of the model is a very simple economy with two goods where each agent is able to produce both goods and to trade. The transaction costs of trading are introduced via a xed time budget and the assumption that nding a trading partner needs some time. We carry out our analysis of this model primarily by the means of computer simulations. This approach has recently gained high importance also in economic research see e.g. Arifovic (1996) , Dawid (1996) , Routledge (1995) , Tesfatsion (1997) , Vriend (1995) ] and chances are they will become even more important in the near future. Although such an approach does not permit exact general results like analytical studies do, it enables us to study complex interactive models which could not be dealt with analytically.
The questions posed in this article are: can boundedly rational agents who all start o as pure producers organize in a way to use the possible pro ts of production specialization and trading and how does the transition from a production economy to an economy with trade look like? There is an ongoing discussion in the trade literature e.g. Krugman (1981) , Note however that there is a some literature dealing with the emergence of a medium of exchange in trade; see e.g. Jones (1976) or Marimon et al. (1990) . man and Krugman (1985) ] whether trade is entirely due to comparative advantages and di ering factor endowments or may also be explained by economies of scale. Traditionally, these questions are dealt with in an equilibrium framework, but here we will also investigate this question using a learning approach. In Dawid (1998) we have established the emergence of trade in a model with homogeneous production technologies and increasing returns to scale. Here we are going to compare these results with the ndings in a model with decreasing returns to scale in production and heterogeneities in the production function.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic simulation model, in section 3 we present our simulation results and in section 4 we discuss these results and carry out a short mathematical analysis which should enhance the understanding of the numerical ndings. We end with some nal remarks in section 5.
The Model
In this section we describe our model. We will rst present the basic version where agents cannot hold stocks and thus only engage in direct trade and afterwards introduce the possibility of becoming a mediator, building up stocks and exclusively concentrating on trading.
The Agents
We model the evolution of a system of n interacting economic agents who may split their available time on production and trading. Each agent has a xed time budget in each period which is normalized to one. There are two goods in the economy and he may spend his time on producing good 1, producing good 2 or trading. There are two di erent types of agents in our model. Agents of type I are more e cient in producing good 1 than good 2 and type II agents are more e cient in producing good 2. These di erent abilities might stem from di ering availability of resources, di ering training of the agents or just di ering talent. For reasons of simplicity we always assume that there is the same number of type I agents in the population as of type II agents. The behavior of agent i is described by his degree of specialization in production, sp i , and the variable s i determining the amount of time he invests in trading. The variables may vary with time but we omit the time argument in our notation. The variable sp i 2 0; 1] denotes the fraction of production time agent i invests in producing the good where he is more e cient. If we denote by x i g the fraction of time the agent invests in producing good g we have . Furthermore, we make the simplifying assumption that the degree of homogeneity is the same in both production functions and, nally, we assume that a type II agent is an exact copy of a type I agent, only with goods 1 and 2 exchanged. The preferences of the agents are represented by the concave utility function . Note that we assume that the two types of agents have di erent production functions but identical preferences. Introducing heterogeneity also with respect to preferences would be an interesting extension of the model which should be followed up in future research.
The trading behavior of the agents is determined as follows: given a price p of good one (expressed in units of good two) the agent has to determine whether he likes to buy or sell good one. Assuming that an agent currently holds i units of good 1, i units of good 2 and maximizes the utility gained by consuming all the goods, he has excess supply respectively demand for good one in the amount of
units. Whenever two agents are matched for trading (the mechanism governing this matching is described below) they exchange goods where the price p is determined such that excess demand for good one equals the supply. It is easy to see that with the supply and demand functions given above there is always a unique price with this property.
2
As mentioned above, we have carried out an analysis of a similar model with homogeneous production technologies in the population and increasing returns to scale in Dawid (1998).
Transactions within a period
Each period t consists of three di erent stages, namely production, trade and consumption.
In the rst stage all agents produce according to their production variables x i g . After production they might trade the good. We denote by i and i the amounts of goods 1 and 2 agent i is holding during the trading period. The holdings vary during the trading period and these variables always denote the current value. Initially, we have for an agent i of type j i = f j 1 (x i 1 ); i = f j 2 (x i 2 ): The trading procedure explicitly introduces search costs into the model. The basic idea is that every agent spends some time looking around and searching for a trading partner. There are some randomly chosen agents in the population he can meet if he invests enough time in trading, but some of these possible matches are never realized because of a lack of time available for search. Think of a producer who has a number of potential trading partners reachable within one day. If he decides to visit one of these agents he might either meet him in the middle, which means that both have to invest time, or { if the other agent does not sacri ce time for trading { go all the way and loose twice as much time. Of course he can also keep producing the whole time and wait for some of his neighbours to come all the way and trade with him.
In our simulations we use the following procedure to determine the trading partners. Two agents i and j can only trade with one another if the sum of the time invested in trading exceeds some given threshold > 0. The initial trading budget for each agent is in each period given by S i = s i and is reduced step by step during the trading period by the amount of time which has already been used for trading. Interpreting the e ort invested in trading as search costs this restriction means that the agents have to invest time for searching for partners if they like to trade. Note, however, that all e ort might be invested by one party allowing "professional" traders who can be reached by others without any costs. De ning the "trading pool" as the set of all agents who might trade in the rest of period t the matching algorithm for trading can be described as follows:
1. Choose randomly an agent i from the trading pool where each agent in the pool is chosen with the same probability. 
is the corresponding price. In other words, we assume that if two (producing) agents meet they are able to determine the price which allows them both to buy respectively sell the optimal amount given the trading price. Afterwards, the holdings of both agents are updated accordingly:
5. Update the time budgets S k = S k ? min S k ; max 2 ; ? S l k = i; j; l = i; j; k 6 = l:
If S j = 0 eliminate j from the trading pool. If S i = 0 eliminate i from the trading pool and check whether there are still agents with S k > 0 in the trading pool. If this holds true go to 1 else stop trading. If S i > 0 goto 2. The time budget updating can be interpreted as follows: if two agents meet where both are looking for a partner each of them has to invest trading time in the amount of 2 to nd the partner; however, if an agent does not actively search for a partner or does so only for a short time (S i < 2 ) he is harder to nd and his partner has to invest more time. Note also that this scheme implies that a trader leaves the market as soon as he has invested all his trading time. Note that the trading scheme described above assumes that passive traders (agents with s i = 0) only trade once and leave the market afterwards.
After the trading period all agents consume their current holding receiving a utility of
Learning
We consider a learning process where all agents review their current strategy every periods. Upon reviewing his strategies an agent i may decide to adopt the strategy of another agent based on the payo in the previous periods. The probability to adopt the strategy of an agent j increases with the past payo of j. Let U j denote the average payo of agent j in the previous T periods. With
the probability that agent i adopts the strategy of agent j is given by
The parameter w 1 governs the inertia of the agent by increasing the probability that he uses his own strategy again in the next periods. After all agents have adopted their new strategies these strategies are disrupted by stochastic shocks. These shocks might incorporate implementation errors of the agents but also intended innovations. With some small probability v > 0 an amount v generated by a normal distribution N(0; the variable is set to 0 or 1 respectively. This completes one learning step and all agents use their new strategies for the next periods. Afterwards another learning step takes place and so on. The proposed learning algorithm describes imitation based adaptation of the agents strategies. The individuals do not build any expectations in order to optimize anticipated payo s but just consider the past success of other individuals and try to imitate the ones with above average utility. Imitational learning rules have been analyzed in several mainly game theoretic contexts e.g. Schlag (1998 ), Vega-Redondo (1995 or Bj ornerstedt and Weibull (1996) ]. The learning dynamics may also be interpreted as a stochastic version of the well known replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker (1978) ) which was thoroughly analyzed in the biological and economic literature e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998), Cressman (1992) ]. Although this kind of adaptation underestimates the complexity of the actual decision making process of economic agents in most contexts it can nevertheless provide interesting insights into the evolution of a population of boundedly rational agents who do not have enough information about their environment to be able to predict future developments in a sensible way or to determine optimal responses to expected future developments. In situations like this the reliance on strategies which worked well in the past may indeed be rational behavior (see also Pingle (1995) ).
Mediators
The fact that we did not allow the agents to build up stocks so far rules out the possibility of the emergence of agents who exclusively concentrate on trading without producing any goods themselves. We call these agents mediators and will now extend the model by allowing the agents to decide to mediate in the market rather than to produce. This is done by adding three more decision variables to the existing three decision variables of each agent. The rst of the three additional variables, id i describes the identity of agent i. Whenever this variable has value 0 the agent is a producer and behaves in exactly the same way as the agents described above. If id i = 1 the agent is a mediator. This implies that s i = 1 and no time is invested in producing. Furthermore, a mediator has a di erent kind of trading behavior than the producing agents. Whereas the producing agents trade in a way to maximize their utility from consumption the meditator rather sells and buys good 1 at xed prices. He sells one unit of good 1 for p i s units of good 2 and buys it for p i b units of the second good. These two prices are decision variables of the agent and again might change over time. Of course, mediators always markup selling from buying prices and we have p i s > p i b . To be able to mediate, an agent has to possess some stocks of both goods. Thus, we assume that whenever an agent changes due to imitation or innovation from production to mediation he initially produces without trading for four periods (two periods for each good) and afterwards completely stops production and starts trading. The stock of good g agent i holds is denoted by l i g . If an agent switches from mediation to production he leaves his stock untouched and is able to use this stock again if he decides to switch back to mediation at some time.
Mediators trade only with producers but never with other mediators.
When a mediator i is matched for trading with a producer j an amount of y ij = min(max(0; g(p i s ; j ; j )); l i that at most one of these two amounts is positive. On the other hand, it is possible that both amounts equal zero and no trade occurs. The minimum operator used in these expressions ensures that no mediator sells a higher amount of a good than he has on stock. After the trade the current holdings of the producer and the stock of the mediator are updated. The mediators try to keep their overall size of stock after consumption constant over the periods. However decreasing marginal utilities of both goods makes it pro table for the mediators to smooth their consumption and consume equal amounts of both goods. Thus, they consume the same aggregate amount of goods they have gained by trading in the current period but split consumption equally between the two goods in order to increase is subtracted from the stock. Learning basically works just like in the model without mediators. The only di erence is that innovation e ects also the three additional decision variables id i ; p i s and p i b . The variable id i is inverted with some small probability id and there is some probability that normally distributed noise is added to the prices. In case that innovations would lead to a violation of p i s > p i b these innovations are neglected.
Simulation Results
In this section we present the results of some computer simulations we ran using the model described above. We will only shortly explain our results in this section, but in section 4 we will provide an extensive discussion of our ndings and will try to draw a rather general picture of the behavior of a population of boundedly rational agents in this setup.
In all our simulations we use a population of size n = 100. The population is initialized homogeneously such that the agents decision variables are given by x i 1 = x i 2 = 1 2 ; s i = 0. The parameters b and a 2 are set to 1.
We always assume that the agents update their strategies every 10 periods ( = 10). The threshold for trading is given by = 0:1 and the inertia parameter for the imitation process was always set to w = 2. Concerning the innovations a normally distributed noise term with expectation 0 and variance = 0:1 is added to a continuous decision variables with probability = 0:02. The simulations were run for T = 3000 generations. Most of our results appear to be robust with respect to changes in these parameters. In cases where we present results of single simulation runs we performed sufcient numbers of runs to check that the results reported here are at least qualitatively robust.
The focus of our studies is the emergence of trade as such, i.e the time evolution of the amount traded, the production and trading strategies and the in uence of certain parameter values on the long run outcome of the system. In particular, we will concentrate on the ratio a 1 =a 2 describing the degree of heterogeneity in the production functions and the returns to scale parameter . In most cases we will present simulation results which we got in the model with mediation. In particular in those cases where no signi cant number of mediators emerge these results are virtually identical to those obtained in the model where agents do not have the option to mediate. In cases where we show results from the model without the possibility of mediation we will point this out.
In our rst two gures we show the time trajectories of the crucial variables of the model in dependence of the ration a 1 =a 1 . In gure 1 we present the trajectories of the average aggregated utility ( U t ), the average degree of specialization ( sp t ), the average time invested in trading ( s t ), the amount of trade in the population (tr t ) measured in units of good 1 and the number of mediators for a 1 = 2 and = 0:5.
Insert gure 1 here
It can be clearly seen that the population basically stays in its initial state where all agents spend all their time for the production of the two goods.
No trade emerges and only at the end of the run the agents specialize a little bit and invest more time for their more e cient production technology. Average utility oscillates but no upward trend can bee seen. Furthermore, the number of mediators is insigni cant throughout the run. This could be seen as an indicator that the learning rule used is just too weak and does not allow for the adoption of trade or more e cient production strategies.
However, if we increase the ratio a 1 =a 2 we get quite di erent results. In gure 2 we show the same variables as in gure 1 for a run with parameter values a 1 = 8; = 0:5.
Insert gure 2 here
Here learning leads to an increase in average utility in the population. We can see that after about 1000 periods of a pure production economy there is a sudden increase both in s t and the trading volume indicating the emergence of massive direct trade. Afterwards, we can observe a rather slow adaptation of the degree of specialization towards the maximal value of one. Whereas the emergence of direct trade initially does not increase average utility the climbing degree of specialization causes an improvement of average utility from U 32 to U 36. Note that the number of mediators is again small throughout the run. However, it is interesting that a little bit of mediation takes place in the periods before direct trade is established in the economy but not any more after the emergence of direct trade.
To get a more systematic picture of the in uence of the ratio a 1 =a 2 on the long run behavior of our model we have performed 10 simulation runs for any integer value of a 1 2 1; 8] and = 0:5. In gure 3 we depict the average values of the ve variables discussed above at the end of the runs 3 .
Insert gure 3 here
The picture is consistent with the observations we made above. Raising a 1 improves average utility at the end of the run and leads to an intensication of trade. The larger a 1 is, the larger is on average the degree of specialization and the time invested in trading. The number of mediators is always very small which suggests that for these values of and direct trade is the only way of goods exchange which can be established. For a 1 3 the average trading volume and the average degree of specialization is rather small which can be seen as an indicator that for such a small heterogeneity no substantial trading evolved in any of the runs. So far we have observed only the emergence of direct trade although the framework we are using in our simulations allows also for massive mediation. At rst sight this is quite surprising, in particular if we compare these ndings to those in the case of homogeneous production technologies with increasing returns to scale (Dawid (1998) ) where in general mediated trade has been the outcome whenever trade emerged at all. So, it is quite natural to suppose that an increase in will not only facilitate trading as such but, in particular, will make mediation more attractive (we will discuss this in the next section in more detail). Hence we now consider the case where = 0:9 which means that we still have decreasing returns to scale but this decrease is very slow now. To facilitate the emergence of trade we further use a very large degree of heterogeneity in the production functions, namely a 1 = 8. For this parameter constellations it is impossible to show a 'representative' simulation run because we could observe two qualitatively di erent outcomes in the various runs. In some cases the long run behavior is characterized by mediated trade whereas in most of the cases only direct trade is carried out. We show an example for each possible outcome in gures 4 and 5.
Insert gures 4 and 5 here
It is interesting to compare these two gures. Initially the two simulation runs develop in quite a similar way. The individuals slowly increase the fraction of time invested in trading which leads to a slowly rising trading volume. The number of mediators is small and seems to be primarily due to random innovations of agents. Altogether, we may say that we observe the emergence of direct trade in both populations. However, at approximately period t = 1500 the characteristics of the run presented in gure 4 changes signi cantly. The value of s t decreases again and the number of mediators starts rising. Together, this gives clear indication that the economy has changed from the mode of direct trade to the use of middlemen in trade.
On the other hand, nothing like this can be observed in gure 5 where s t stays at a level of about 0.15 till the end of the run and the number of mediators shows only short lasting upward swings. Although the trading volume is larger in the case where mediated trade develops, the individuals gain on average a higher utility if it does not. If we would draw a similar gure as gure 3 for = 0:9 we would see that not only the trading volume but also the average number of long run mediators increases with a 1 . For a 1 = 8 we get an average number of approximately 8 long run mediators per simulation run. This number is too small for an economy with mediation but too large to be due to random mutations. So, this suggests that some of the ten runs look like gure 4 and others like gure 5. The fact that the long run behavior of the population di ers also qualitatively from run to run is of course due to the random nature of the dynamics. We will discuss this matter in more detail in the next section. A way to facilitate a more robust development of mediation should be to increase the search time needed for trading, . This increases the opportunity costs occurring in the case of direct trading but may not a ect the utility of mediators if the number of individuals they can trade with is determined by the ratio of mediators to producers rather than by the time constraint. In order to verify this conjecture we have performed simulations for values of in the range 0:05; 0:3]. The average long run results are depicted in gure 6.
Insert gure 6 here
As expected, the average utility and trading volume decreases with increasing . However, the average number of mediators increases with as long as the trading time threshold is small. At the same time the fraction of time invested in trading by the producers decreases. This shows that the fraction of cases where mediated trade emerges increases with . We have also carried out numerical experiments for the same parameter values in the model without mediators and here we get for larger values of signi cantly smaller trading volumes. In particular, trade basically vanishes for > 0:2.
Thus, in the presence of such large search costs the possibility of mediated trade seems to be essential for the development of the exchange of goods in the economy.
Finally, we would like to mention that we also examined the in uence of other parameters in the model, like the level of inertia or noise. However, sensible variations of these parameters did not change the qualitative behavior of the model and we do not present these numerical experiments here.
Discussion
Having presented the simulation results in the previous section we will now use them to gain a better understanding of the dynamic process of self organization in this economy. From a mathematical point of view the evolution of the population state can be described by a time homogeneous Markov process on a continuous state space. Due to the extremely complicated structure of the transition functions a rigorous mathematical analysis seems to be impossible and even approximation results for decreasing mutation probabilities are out of reach 4 . Thus, simulations seem to be the only available means in order to study the dynamic behavior of the system. However, we will discuss the simulation results using very loose comparative static analyses pointing out some properties of the static model with completely rational agents. This allows us to make some observations on how successful the self-organization of the population has been.
In the last section we have seen that three qualitatively di erent population states emerged as the long run outcome of our model. One which exhibits no trade, one with direct trade and one with mediated trade respectively. A goal of this study is to determine how e cient the self organization of the market is with boundedly rational agents. In order to answer this question we have to derive 'benchmarks' of perfectly organized economies of certain types which can be compared to our simulation results. Thus, we will now consider for each of these three cases an 'equilibrium' state 5 which has the corresponding properties and calculate the individuals strategies and payo s. These calculations will be used to discuss some of the simulation results in more detail.
Let Kandori and Rob (1995) derive a general theory characterizing the long run outcome of learning dynamics with noise for low levels of noise. However, this theory needs a discrete state space and also a much simpler mode of interaction than we have in our model. 5 We are using this term in a rather loose sense here. In particular in the case with direct trade it is not obvious whether the state we consider is indeed an equilibrium in a strict game theoretic sense.
If the population is indeed organized in such a way it is quite costly to start trading because the whole search costs have to be carried by the individual who is looking for a trading partner. Thus, we might conjecture that such a state is stable as long as the gains from trade are not too large. It is easy to see that the payo of specialization increases both with and the ratio a 1 =a 2 . On the other hand, the opportunity costs of trading depend primarily on . Increasing the value makes trading more costly in the sense that the amount of output which could be produced in the time which is invested in trading increases. However, a high also decreases the payo of an agent producing both goods because he has to produce in a less e cient part of his production set and his consumption plan gets more skewed towards the good he can produce more e ciently.
Considering gure 1 we realize that the long run outcome of this simulation very closely resembles the state described above. In the end of the run the agents slightly specialize in the production of the good they can produce more e ciently and approach the optimal value sp 0:6135. The gained utility is almost identical to U tr which is for these parameter values given by U pr = 2:04 (remember that we depict the added utility of 10 periods).
On the other hand, we may infer from gure 3 that the no trade states only emerge for values a 1 3. For larger values of a 1 normally trade gets established. For small values of this is always direct trade.
In order to study a state with direct trade we consider a situation where all individuals invest a fraction 2 of their time for trading and the rest entirely for producing their more e cient good; i.e. we have s i = 2 ; x i 1 = 1?2 ; x i 2 = 0 for all type I agents and s i = 2 ; x i 1 = 0; x i 2 = 1?2 for all type II agents. The theoretically optimal value of s i is rather di cult to determine because we have to take into account the stochastic matching algorithm. An individual has to trade o the probability not to meet a trading partner of the other type against the loss of production due to excessive investment in trading time. The value used here is suggested by the simulation results. If we make the simplifying assumption that in every period every agent meets at least one agent of the other type who is willing to trade (note that in this setup every agent meets four other individuals per period for trading) we can easily calculate the corresponding expected payo :
U tr = 2 r a 1 2 (1 ? 2 )
Thus, we see that also in the run depicted in gure 2 learning was quite e cient. The utility increases quite signi cantly due to the trading and reaches a level of U 35:5 compared to the maximal possible payo of U tr = 37:8. Part of the gap between the two values is due to the fact that individuals are not completely specialized in production, but it seems that there is also some loss of utility because of failures to trade in a period.
Comparing the values U pr and U tr we realize that the individuals are better o in a state with direct trade than in a pure production state if the fraction a 1 =a 2 is large compared to . As could be expected from our considerations above the e ect of an increase of 2 0; 1) is ambiguous and depends on a 1 ; a 2 and . Of course we can not infer from the fact that U tr is larger than U pr that direct trade emerges in the population. This does only imply that trading pays o after it has been established in the population. But the pure production state could still be evolutionary stable. However, looking at gure 3 we see that direct trade emerges for a 1 4 and U tr > U pr holds under this parameter constellation for a 1 3:07. So the two values are rather close here.
Finally, we also like to consider a perfectly organized state where mediation has already been established and compute the agents' payo . These ndings will be compared to the outcomes of our learning process where mediation did emerge exempli ed by the run depicted in gure 4.
We assume that a fraction r of the agents mediate, which means that they use the strategy x 1 = x 2 = 0; s = 1. The number of type I and type II agents among the mediators is equal. The rest of type I agents use Let us further assume that the trader buys good 1 at a price of p and sells it at a price of 1 p (such a behavior is optimal due to symmetry) and that he can always deliver the quantity of goods he likes to trade. Given these simplifying assumptions it is easy to see that the income per period of a trader is given by U med = 2b s a 1 p These considerations show that in a perfectly organized population with mediated trade there should be about 20% mediators in the population if a heterogeneous state consisting of producers and mediators emerges. In such a case the expected payo of producers and mediators would be equal given that the mediators choose an optimal price and the producers indeed use all their time for production. Comparing these ndings with the simulation result shown in gure 4 we realize how well the self organization has worked here. We have indeed about 20 mediators and average utility per period is only slightly smaller than U med = 33:6. We now also see that the fact that direct trading as shown in gure 5 leads to a larger long run average utility than mediated trade for this parameter constellation is no accident. Even if mediation is established in the economy in its most e cient way the average utility could still be improved if the population would go back to direct trading. Of course this crucially depends on the parameter values, and in particular does not hold any more if the trading costs or the parameter increase 6 . Thus, it is very interesting to observe that in almost half of our simulation runs with these parameter values mediated trade did emerge. A possible explanation is a 'lock-in' e ect. For the rst individuals who start mediating in a population of producers who invest also some time in trading the pro t of mediation is rather large because the number of individuals they can trade with is only bounded by the time constraint but there is no competition with other mediators. Thus, initially mediation yields large payo s and accordingly more agents start mediating. However, if producers do not have to look for trading partners they do invest less time in trading. At the same time payo s of mediators go down because the ratio of producers to mediators decreases. This leads to smaller average utility values than before mediation was initiated, however there is no way back because an agent who likes to start direct trading now is very unlikely to nd a trading partner who both produces and invests time in trading. This e ect can be seen quite nicely in gure 4 where we have direct trade up to period 1500 and mediation gets established afterwards causing a slight decrease in average utility. Obviously, this lock-in takes place in some of the cases but not in all of them. Thus, it is almost impossible to predict in such a setting whether in the long run mediated trade will be present in the economy or not.
Conclusions
In this paper we use an agent based learning model to study the emergence of trade in a production economy. We distinguish between two di erent kinds of trade, direct trade and mediated trade, and study their emergence in a setup with two types of agents who are distinguished by their production functions. Our learning rule does not involve any foresight whatsoever but only imitation based on past performance coupled with random innovations. Loosely speaking, in this framework a shop has to be pro table right from the start in order to survive.
Depending on the parameter constellations considered we could observe three qualitatively di erent long run outcomes of the simulation: a pure production state, a state with mediated trade and a state where all exchange is performed via middlemen. Whereas we never encountered the coexistence of signi cant direct and mediated trade we observed that mediation emerged out of a state where direct trade has already been developed. The fact that the long run behavior may look qualitatively di erent for di erent runs even if the model and the parameters keep the same stresses the importance an approach where the dynamic process of self organization is explicitly modelled. However, it also suggests that a re ned description of the individuals learning behavior may allow additional insights. Also, it should be investigated in how far the results obtained here change in the framework of a multi-good economy or in a spatial model with local interaction. We plan to tackle these questions in future research. 
